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Improperly Divorced from Its Roots: The 
Rationales of the Collateral Source Rule and 




Dubbed an “oddit[y] of American accident law,”1 the collateral 
source rule travels the path to extinction.2  Currently, only twelve states 
retain the rule’s immaculate common law form.3  Reacting to a perceived 
medical malpractice crisis,4 twenty states have modified the rule,5 and, in 
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 1. John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CAL. L. 
REV. 1478, 1478 (1966). 
 2. See James L. Branton, The Collateral Source Rule, 18 ST. MARY’S L.J. 883, 887–88 n.23 
(1987) (compiling statutes that abolished the collateral source rule in whole or in part); Christopher 
J. Eaton, Comment, The Kansas Legislature’s Attempt to Abrogate the Collateral Source Rule: 
Three Strikes and They’re Out?, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 913, 916−20 (1994) (surveying the Kansas 
legislature’s three unsuccessful attempts to modify the Kansas collateral source rule). 
 3. As of February 2006, only the common law collateral source rules in Arkansas, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, 
and Wyoming remain intact.  Melinda Young, Note, Victim’s Rights Versus Special Interest: A 
Difficult Choice for the Kansas Legislature in Its Fight to Abrogate the Collateral Source Rule, 45 
WASHBURN L.J. 135, 137 n.24 (2005); see also CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, THE MEDICAL 
PROFESSION—MORE PROTECTION FOR NEGLIGENCE THAN ANY PROFESSION IN THE COUNTRY 
(2005), http://www.centerjd.org/free/medmallist.htm (compiling changes in tort reform in the fifty 
states).  Hawaii’s unique collateral source rule allows third parties to file liens against the plaintiff’s 
award and does not permit evidence of collateral source benefits to reduce the plaintiff’s damages.  
Young, supra, at 137 n.24. 
 4. See infra note 117 (citing articles detailing the perceived medical malpractice crisis). 
 5. Several states have abrogated the rule only in the medical malpractice context.  For 
example, California allows defendants to introduce evidence of collateral source payments in actions 
based on the professional negligence of a medical service provider.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West 
1997).  Similarly, South Dakota permits the admissibility of collateral source payments in actions 
against medical service providers for “special damages” if the benefit was paid or is payable by 
insurance, the benefit is not subject to subrogation, and the benefit is not purchased privately or paid 
for or payable by government programs.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-12 (2004).  The following 
states possess similar statutes: Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-565 (2003)), Delaware (DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6862 (1999)), Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2906(2) (2000)), 
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even more ambitious attempts at tort reform, fourteen states have simply 
abrogated the rule.6  Courts in four states, including Kansas, have found 
these legislative measures unconstitutional.7 
Comprehending the conflict over the Kansas collateral source rule 
requires understanding the rule itself.  The rule prohibits a defendant 
from introducing evidence of benefits or payments made by a third party 
unrelated to the defendant.8  Although somewhat counterintuitive, the 
doctrine effectively allows courts to award plaintiffs the reasonable value 
of their economic damages,9 even if a third party paid on the plaintiff’s 
                                                                                                                       
Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-06(f) (LexisNexis 2002)), Massachusetts 
(MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60G(a) (West 2000)), Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.021 
(2005)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-1708.1D (West 2004)), Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 9-19-34.1 (1997)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-119 (2000)), Utah (UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-14-4.5 (2002)), Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.080 (West 1992)), and 
Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.55(7) (West 2006)).  Other states have abrogated the rule in 
particular situations.  See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1205.1 (West 2003) (providing for 
offsets of benefits over $25,000 if the offset does not reduce the judgment by more than fifty 
percent); MO. ANN. STAT. § 490.715 (West Supp. 2006) (modifying the collateral source rule to 
allow the introduction of the amount paid by a third party but not the name of such third party); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-308 (2005) (permitting admissibility of collateral source payments made 
by a third party when the total award is more than $50,000, unless the third party has a right to 
subrogation).  These states have responded to a perceived medical malpractice crisis.  See Narayen v. 
Bailey, 747 A.2d 195, 201 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (“In response to this crisis, many states 
enacted legislation to modify or abrogate the collateral source rule in medical malpractice cases.”).  
Additionally, New Jersey has abrogated the rule, except in cases of workers’ compensation and life 
insurance.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-97 (West 2000). 
 6. The following states have entirely abrogated their collateral source rules: Alabama (ALA. 
CODE § 6-5-545 (2005)), Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.070 (2004)), Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 13-21-111.6 (2004)), Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-225a (West 2005)), Florida (FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 768.76 (West 2005)), Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1606 (2004)), Indiana (IND. CODE 
ANN. § 34-44-1-2 (LexisNexis 1998)), Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.14 (West 1998)), Michigan 
(MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6303 (West 2000)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.36 (West 
2000)), New York (N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(f) (McKinney 2005)), North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 
32-03.2-06 (1996)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.20 (LexisNexis 2005)), and Oregon (OR. 
REV. STAT. § 31.580 (2005) (formerly § 18.580; renumbered 2003)). 
 7. For example, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found unconstitutional a statute that 
abolished the New Hampshire collateral source rule.  Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 836 (N.H. 
1980), noted in Am. Tort Reform Ass’n, New Hampshire Reforms, http://www.atra.org/states/NH 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2006).  The Georgia Supreme Court held that a statute abrogating the rule 
violated the Georgia Constitution.  Denton v. Con-Way S. Express, Inc., 402 S.E.2d 269, 272 (Ga. 
1991), overruled on other grounds by Grissom v. Gleason, 418 S.E.2d 27 (Ga. 1992), as recognized 
in McKin v. Gilbert, 432 S.E.2d 233, 235 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).  Kentucky followed Georgia’s lead.  
O’Bryan v. Hedgespeth, 892 S.W.2d 571, 578 (Ky. 1995).  Kansas courts have invalidated similar 
statutes in three situations.  See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Kansas legislature’s three failed 
attempts to abrogate the collateral source rule). 
 8. William E. Westerbeke & Stephen R. McAllister, Survey of Kansas Tort Law: Part I, 49 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1037, 1110 (2001). 
 9. Economic damages, as opposed to noneconomic damages, “‘include the cost of medical 
care, past and future, and related benefits, i.e., lost wages, loss of earning capacity, and other such 
losses.’”  Shirley v. Smith, 933 P.2d 651, 657 (Kan. 1997) (quoting Shirley v. Smith, 916 P.2d 730, 
733 (Kan Ct. App. 1996)). 
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behalf.10  Generally, courts apply the rule where a third party makes a 
gratuitous payment or an insurance company pays medical expenses on 
behalf of the plaintiff.11 
Insurance and government benefits have significantly complicated 
the collateral source rule’s application;12 their establishment has led 
courts to inconsistently apply the rule where Medicare, Medicaid, or 
private insurance companies have contracted for a write-off with medical 
service providers.13  In these write-off agreements, medical service 
providers write off a contractually agreed-upon amount, and Medicare, 
Medicaid, or the private insurance company pays only a portion of the 
original amount billed by the medical service provider.14  Thus, an issue 
remains unanswered: Does the collateral source rule limit the plaintiff to 
economic damages equal to the amount paid15 by Medicaid or Medicare, 
or does it entitle the plaintiff to the amount originally billed by the 
medical service provider?16  Plaintiffs and defendants steadfastly argue 
                                                     
 10. Young, supra note 3, at 135. 
 11. 25 C.J.S. Damages § 172–73 (2002). 
 12. See Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 630 N.W.2d 201, 208 (Wis. 2001) (“Pursuant to [negotiated and 
contracted discounts], an insurer’s liability for the medical expenses billed to its insured is often 
satisfied at discounted rates, with the remainder being ‘written-off’ by the health care provider.”). 
 13. Compare Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149, 1157 (Haw. 2004) (noting that the collateral 
source rule entitles plaintiffs to receive the amount paid by the insurer and the written-off amount), 
with Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 765 A.2d 786, 790 (Pa. 2001) (capping plaintiff’s 
economic damages at the amount actually paid by the insurance company to the medical service 
provider). 
 14. See, e.g., Rose v. Via Christi Health Sys., Inc. (Rose I), 78 P.3d 798, 800 (Kan. 2003) 
(“Medicare fully paid for [the patient’s] medical expenses in accordance with its payment contract 
with [the medical service provider], which required [the medical service provider] to write off 
$154,193.24 of the $242,104.84 that it billed.”), modified on reh’g, 113 P.3d 241 (Kan. 2005).  See 
infra Part II.A.2 for an example of the collateral source rule’s applicability to Medicare write-offs. 
 15. For purposes of clarity, this Comment attempts to use two terms to refer to the possible 
amounts recoverable by plaintiffs in this scenario.  First, the plaintiff may recover the “actual 
amount paid” by his or her medical service provider or $35,000.  Second, the plaintiff may recover 
the “original amount billed” by his or her medical service provider or $50,000. 
 16. See Rose I, 78 P.3d at 802 (noting that the defendant argued the “trial court should have 
limited the evidence of medical expenses to those amounts actually paid, without including the 
amounts it wrote off”).  Cases where the tortfeasor is both the defendant and the medical service 
provider further complicate a court’s ability to allocate damages under the collateral source rule and 
write-off frameworks.  Usually, this occurs when the plaintiff is injured due to the medical service 
provider’s negligence.  E.g., id. at 806 (Luckert, J., dissenting) (noting that where the tortfeasor is 
the medical service provider, the collateral source cannot be “wholly independent of and collateral to 
the wrongdoer”).  In these cases, both the defendant and the plaintiff have contracted with Medicare 
or Medicaid.  The defendant hospital’s contract establishes a fee schedule by which the medical 
service provider agrees to charge Medicare or Medicaid, and the plaintiff’s insurance contract 
entitles the plaintiff to the benefits contracted for by the defendant.  This Comment does not address 
this specific issue: the rule’s purposes do not apply to this situation, and the Kansas Supreme Court 
has already settled it.  See Rose v. Via Christi Health Sys., Inc. (Rose II), 113 P.3d 241, 248 (Kan. 
2005) (holding that where the tortfeasor is both the defendant and the medical service provider, the 
trial court may allow “a setoff or credit against the portion of the economic loss attributable to 
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that a ruling against one will constitute a windfall for the other.  
Tortfeasors typically stress that courts must not allow plaintiffs to receive 
write-offs because no one has incurred the costs.  Generally, the plaintiff 
responds that courts relieving tortfeasors from liability effectively grant 
tortfeasors undeserved windfalls.17 
The Kansas collateral source rule’s application to write-offs has 
particularly confused practitioners.18  Seeking to clarify this murky area 
of the law, the Kansas legislature recently attacked the rule for a fourth 
time.19  Had Senate Bill 33520 passed, Kansas would have become the 
fifteenth state to eradicate its rule.21  Although the bill did not survive 
legislative muster,22 at least one commentator has questioned the bill’s 
practicality and constitutionality.23  Regardless, Kansas’s legislative and 
judicial struggles with “write-off law” offer important lessons for both 
future Kansas legislation and states considering action in this area. 
This Comment strives to learn from these lessons.  Part II describes 
related legal concepts,24 discusses other states’ approaches to the write-
off question,25 explains the relevant historical background on the Kansas 
collateral source rule’s inception and proposed abrogation,26 and 
illustrates the legal ambivalence of the Kansas collateral source rule’s 
applicability to Medicare and Medicaid write-offs.27  Part III applies the 
                                                                                                                       
medical expenses in the amount of the Medicare write-off, an amount not paid by the plaintiff, 
Medicare, or any third party, and which reflected a cost incurred by the defendant”). 
 17. See, e.g., Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Hodgen, 884 So. 2d 801, 817 (Ala. 2003) 
(contrasting these competing arguments).  Economic theory underlies the idea that the tortfeasor 
receives a windfall if the court releases him from liability.  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 201 (4th ed. 1992).  In theory, deterrence and accountability possess an economic 
value.  Allowing the defendant to escape full liability theoretically results in less deterrence and 
accountability than the tortfeasor would have otherwise been subject to.  Id. 
 18. See infra Part II.C (explaining the uncertainty in Kansas write-off law). 
 19. See infra Part II.B.3 (describing the Kansas legislature’s three previous attempts to abrogate 
or modify the collateral source rule); see also infra Part II.B.4 (providing a summary of Senate Bill 
335, which recently attempted to abrogate the Kansas collateral source rule). 
 20. S. 335, 2005–06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2006). 
 21. See supra note 6 (listing the fourteen states that have eradicated their collateral source 
rules). 
 22. The bill died in committee on May 25, 2006.  Kansas Legislature, http:// 
www.kslegislature.org/legsrv-billtrack/searchBills.do (enter “335” as the bill number and click “Get 
Bill Status”) (last visited Sept. 8, 2006).  Regardless of Senate Bill 335’s failure to survive the 
legislative process, this Comment argues that the legislature may constitutionally abrogate the rule 
and provides suggestions for strengthening the bill in light of anticipated constitutional challenges.  
See infra Part III.D. 
 23. Young, supra note 3, at 159–73. 
 24. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 25. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 26. See infra Part II.B. 
 27. See infra Part II.C. 
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collateral source rule to Medicare and Medicaid and provides a 
theoretical framework for courts to analyze the collateral source rule.28  
Additionally, Part III critically analyzes three general answers developed 
by sister jurisdictions29 and, anticipating further challenges to the 
collateral source rule, analyzes the constitutionality of a bill abrogating 
the rule.30 
Ultimately, this Comment proposes three arguments, all dependent 
on a single premise: defendant deterrence and accountability constitute 
the primary policy rationales underlying the Kansas collateral source 
rule.31  First, the rule’s twin policies direct courts to apply the collateral 
source rule to write-offs.32  Second, Kansas courts will respect the rule’s 
policies only by adopting a reasonable-value approach and awarding the 
original amount billed by the medical service provider.33  However, this 
does not imply the Kansas Constitution necessarily shields the rule34—
hence this Comment’s last argument: contrary to many commentators’ 
opinions, an attempt to abrogate the Kansas rule may withstand 
constitutional scrutiny under a rational basis standard of review.35  
Leaving the rule’s fate to a political process not necessarily obstructed by 
the Kansas Constitution, the Kansas legislature can in fact decide 
whether its collateral source rule stays or goes. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A brief history of the collateral source rule helps one understand how 
the establishment of government benefits and private insurance, 
especially the consequent write-offs from medical service providers, has 
                                                     
 28. See infra Part III.  Some courts have drawn this line.  See, e.g., Robinson v. Bates, 828 
N.E.2d 657, 665–69 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (compiling case law from several jurisdictions 
recognizing the statute distinction), discretionary appeal accepted, 835 N.E.2d 381 (Ohio 2005).  
However, none has provided a policy-driven rationale specifically tying the collateral source rule’s 
deterrent and punitive policies to write-offs.  Moreover, this Comment seeks to address Kansas 
jurisprudence and to reject the payment/nonpayment distinction upon which too many courts have 
been fixated. 
 29. See infra Part III.B. 
 30. See infra Part III.C. 
 31. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 32. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 33. See infra Part III.B (arguing that courts may respect the collateral source rule’s policies 
only if they award plaintiffs the original amount paid by the medical service provider as the 
reasonable value of their services). 
 34. A commentator has recently reached the opposite conclusion.  See Young, supra note 3, at 
167–69 (stating “an abrogation of the collateral source rule, no matter how presented, will violate the 
Kansas Constitution”). 
 35. See infra Part III.C. 
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complicated economic damages.  In addition to providing such a 
history,36 this Part discusses the necessary background for understanding 
write-offs37 and surveys the analytical frameworks adopted by sister 
jurisdictions in their struggles with the write-off problem.38  Finally, 
attempting to elucidate the dilemma faced by Kansas lawmakers, this 
Part exposes the ambivalence in Kansas case law that purports to address 
the collateral source rule’s applicability to write-offs.39 
A. Write-Offs 101: Relevant Principles, the Problem, and Proposed 
Solutions 
1. Medicare, Medicaid, and Subrogation 
a. Medicare and Medicaid Premiums 
Write-off analysis partially depends on whether the government 
benefits provider, in this case Medicare or Medicaid, charges premiums 
to its beneficiary.  Medicare is composed of four parts: Hospital 
Insurance (Part A), Medical Insurance (Part B), Medicare Advantage 
(Part C), and prescription drug coverage (Part D).40  Insureds do not pay 
premiums for Part A.41  In contrast, Part B, C, and D beneficiaries 
generally pay for their services with monthly premiums.42  Insureds may 
not have to pay premiums if they receive Medicare and possess “limited 
monthly income,”43 in which case the state may pay their premiums or, 
in limited situations, even pay their entire deductibles and other medical  
 
                                                     
 36. See infra Part II.B (addressing the inception and the attempted modifications of the Kansas 
collateral source rule). 
 37. See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing Medicare and Medicaid premiums and subrogation). 
 38. See infra Part II.A.3 (providing background on the three approaches used by other 
jurisdictions). 
 39. See infra Part II.C (narrating and attempting to synthesize relevant Kansas case law). 
 40. Social Security Online, http://www.ssa.gov (select “Medicare” from the “Frequently Asked 
Questions” pulldown menu and click “Go”; then follow “What are the differences between Medicare 
Parts A, B, C, and D?” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 26, 2006). 
 41. See id. (“Part A is paid for by a portion of social security tax.”).  But see Hodge v. 
Middletown Hosp. Ass’n, 581 N.E.2d 529, 532–33 (Ohio 1991) (awarding amount under Part A in 
medical malpractice suit and holding Part A falls under the definition of insurance because it is 
funded by payments from employer and employee paychecks). 
 42. Social Security Online, supra note 40. 
 43. Social Security Online, http://www.ssa.gov (select “Medicare” from the “Frequently Asked 
Questions” pulldown menu and click “Go”; then follow “Is it true that you can get help paying 
Medicare premiums?” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 26, 2006). 
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expenses.44  Medicare beneficiaries may choose from different plans, all 
varying in costs and services.45 
Medicaid, on the other hand, is a state-federal program through 
which the federal government grants funds to states to aid the poor, 
elderly, and disabled with medical expenses.46  In Kansas, Chapter 39 of 
the Kansas Statutes Annotated governs Medicaid.47  Although certain 
individuals pay a nominal fee for Medicaid benefits,48 most beneficiaries 
do not pay premiums.49 
Premiums comprise only part of the equation.  Subrogation allows 
Medicare and Medicaid to recover payments made on behalf of their 
beneficiaries.  Thus, a broader comprehension of the framework 
underlying write-offs partially depends on an understanding of 
subrogation.50 
b. Subrogation 
An insurer’s payment of a claim for damages caused by a third party 
entitles the insurer to subrogation.51  Through subrogation, a third party 
pays the plaintiff’s debt and then “receives” the plaintiff’s rights and 
remedies.52  Three rationales underlie this insurance doctrine: indemnity 
                                                     
 44. See id. (“[The insured’s] state may help [the insured] with [the insured’s] Medicare and 
may also pay Medicare deductibles and coinsurance amounts.”). 
 45. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
CMS PUB. NO. 10050, MEDICARE & YOU 2006, at 37 (2006), available at http://www.medicare.gov/ 
Publications/Pubs/pdf/10050.pdf (explaining that the amount an insured pays depends partly on 
whether the plan he or she chooses has a premium in addition to the standard Medicare monthly 
premium). 
 46. HARVEY L. MCCORMICK, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES § 22:1 
(4th ed. 2005) (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396). 
 47. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-701 to -784 (2000 & Supp. 2005) (providing the legal 
framework of Kansas Medicaid). 
 48. Rose v. Via Christi Health Sys., Inc. (Rose I), 78 P.3d 798, 803 (Kan. 2003), modified on 
reh’g, 113 P.3d 241 (Kan. 2005). 
 49. See Hodge v. Middletown Hosp. Ass’n, 581 N.E.2d 529, 532 (Ohio 1991) (“Neither the 
beneficiary nor [the beneficiary’s] employer pays premiums or underwrites the cost of the 
[Medicaid] program.”). 
 50. See infra Part II.A.2 (illustrating the interplay between subrogation and the collateral source 
rule as it applies to Medicare write-offs). 
 51. ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2D § 141.1[A] (2d ed. 2003). 
 52. Id.  An example should clarify this principle.  Assume defendant, D, negligently caused an 
accident and injured plaintiff, P.  P’s medical expenses amount to $100,000, and P’s insurance 
company pays the full amount.  Through subrogation, D (or D’s insurance company) now owes 
$100,000 to P’s insurance company, not to P.  Thus, P’s insurance company is the subrogee, and P is 
the subrogor.  When P’s insurance company pays P’s medical expenses, P’s insurance company 
acquires P’s right to collect the money from D. 
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preservation,53 double recovery prevention,54 and tortfeasor 
accountability.55  In the medical insurance context,56 the insurer’s right to 
exert this principle depends on a policy provision providing for 
subrogation.  However, unlike private insurance, the controlling statutes 
of Medicare and Medicaid grant these programs an automatic right of 
subrogation.57 
2. The Problem 
To illustrate the issue addressed by this Comment, assume a 
tortfeasor negligently injures a plaintiff, and the plaintiff consequently 
incurs medical expenses.  The medical service provider initially bills the 
plaintiff $50,000.  The plaintiff is a beneficiary of Medicare, and this 
program previously negotiated a $15,000 write-off with the medical 
service provider for the plaintiff’s services.  Thus, the actual amount paid 
by Medicare to the medical service provider is $35,000.  The plaintiff 
then sues the tortfeasor asserting economic damages of $50,000, the 
amount originally billed by the medical service provider.  Medicare 
reserves a statutory right to subrogate the amount actually paid, 
$35,000.58  At issue is thus whether the tortfeasor will bear the additional 
$15,000 burden or whether the court will allow the tortfeasor to 
introduce evidence of the $15,000 write-off to effectively limit the 
plaintiff’s damages to $35,000. 
If the court allows the plaintiff to receive the $15,000 write-off, then 
the $15,000 burden falls on the defendant.  Although the plaintiff pockets 
$15,000, the court subjects the defendant to the full extent of his liability.  
                                                     
 53. Id. § 141.1[D][1].  Most insurance contracts are indemnity contracts; if insureds receive 
more than what they lost, they might be encouraged to incur losses.  Id. 
 54. Id. § 141.1[D][2].  Subrogation effectively eliminates the possibility that the insured might 
receive a windfall.  See id. (“The policy underlying subrogation is to prevent an unwarranted 
windfall to the insured.”). 
 55. Id. § 141.1[D][3].  Subrogation “ensures that the person who in good conscience ought to 
pay a loss (the tortfeasor) does in fact pay the loss.”  Id. 
 56. The author does not attempt to distinguish between legal and contractual subrogation 
because “most insurance policies include subrogation provisions,” so the distinction between legal 
and contractual generally is legally irrelevant.  Id. § 141.2[C][2]. 
 57. See Gary D. White, Jr., Practitioner’s Guide to Subrogation Liens and Reimbursement 
Rights, J. KAN. TRIAL LAW. ASS’N, Mar. 1995, at 5, 5 (“When Medicare has paid benefits and a third 
party is responsible for the injury, Medicare has a subrogation right to the extent it has paid 
benefits.” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395(y)(b)(2)(B); 42 C.F.R. § 411.26)).  The Deficit Reduction Act of 
1984, 42 U.S.C. § 1395(y)(b)(2)(B)(iv), provides “the United States will be subrogated (to the extent 
Medicare payment has been made for an item or service) to any right of an individual.”  
MCCORMICK, supra note 46, § 1:72.  Similarly, the state of Kansas retains an automatic right of 
subrogation in cases involving Medicaid.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-719a (2005). 
 58. White, supra note 57, at 5. 
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Conversely, if the court permits the defendant to introduce evidence of 
the write-off, then the court presumably relieves the defendant from 
$15,000 worth of liability.  The practical result in this second scenario is 
the following: the plaintiff pockets nothing, and the court holds the 
defendant fully liable for the damages he would have caused but for the 
plaintiff’s contractual agreement with Medicare or Medicaid.59 
Not surprisingly, this scenario has met significantly inconsistent 
applications across, and even within,60 jurisdictions.  If Louisiana law 
governs, the court will likely award the plaintiff the $15,000 because he, 
theoretically, bargained for the Medicare benefits.61  In contrast, had the 
plaintiff been a Medicaid beneficiary, the court would not have awarded 
him the write-off, reasoning that he never bargained for the benefit.62  In 
Hawaii, the plaintiff would receive the original amount billed by the 
medical service provider—the program at issue is irrelevant.63  Similarly, 
states that have abrogated their collateral source rules would likely allow 
the tortfeasor to introduce evidence of the write-off, regardless of 
whether Medicare or Medicaid write-offs are at issue.64  Kansas adds to 
this uncertainty: the uncertain legal relevance of the government benefits 
at issue and the Kansas collateral source rule’s applicability produced a 
cacophony of results.65 
3. Three Proposed Solutions 
While a look at other jurisdictions’ rules may not per se settle this 
quandary, an exposition of other jurisdictions’ approaches to this 
problem helps Kansas tailor an appropriate rule.  With this purpose in 
                                                     
 59. Either way, Medicare is at a $0 balance because it automatically subrogates the $35,000 
paid by the defendant.  See supra Part II.A.1.b (discussing subrogation principles as applicable to 
Medicare and Medicaid). 
 60. See, e.g., infra Part II.C (exploring the uncertainty in Kansas law regarding Medicare and 
Medicaid write-offs). 
 61. See infra Part II.A.3.a (explaining the benefit-of-the-bargain approach). 
 62. See infra notes 231−37 and accompanying text (noting that, in jurisdictions utilizing the 
benefit-of-the-bargain approach, Medicare beneficiaries, but not those covered by Medicaid, 
generally receive the write-off because they have paid premiums for the coverage). 
 63. See supra note 3 (noting the Hawaii collateral source rule does not allow courts to undercut 
plaintiffs’ damages with evidence of collateral sources); see also infra note 92 (noting one may 
reasonably refer to Hawaii write-off law as the “full amount” approach). 
 64. See, e.g., Goble v. Frohman, 901 So. 2d 830, 832–33 (Fla. 2005) (prohibiting recovery of 
private insurance write-offs, in part because of FLA. STAT. § 768.76 (1999), which orders courts to 
reduce awards by the collateral source benefits); Dyet v. McKinley, 81 P.3d 1236, 1238–39 (Idaho 
2003) (limiting recovery to the actual amount paid by Medicare and considering IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 6-1606 (2003), which prohibits double recoveries from collateral sources). 
 65. See infra Part II.C (discussing the obscurity in Kansas law regarding write-offs). 
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mind, this Subpart outlines the three prevalent approaches utilized by 
sister jurisdictions: benefit-of-the-bargain,66 actual-amount-paid,67 and 
reasonable-value.68 
a. Benefit-of-the-Bargain Approach69 
The benefit-of-the-bargain approach allows a plaintiff to recover the 
full value of her medical expenses, including the write-off, if she has 
paid consideration for her benefit.70  Bozeman v. State71 provides an 
example.  There, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a Medicaid 
recipient could not collect Medicaid write-offs because he had neither 
personally bargained for the benefit nor paid the premiums.72  In contrast, 
plaintiffs who have bargained for insurance enjoy entitlement to the 
benefit of their bargain and may recover the original amount billed by 
their medical service provider.73 
This rendition of the benefit-of-the-bargain approach oversimplifies 
its nature.  Courts adopting this rationale significantly differ in the 
approach’s implementation.  The differences arise from the courts’ 
perspectives of Medicare and Medicaid requirements; the key here is the 
court’s view of whether the plaintiff actually paid any consideration for 
either of these two programs.  Subscribing to this approach, for example, 
the Commonwealth of Virginia74 awards private insurance write-offs to 
plaintiffs because of their presumed bargains with their insurance 
companies.75  The Kansas Supreme Court extended this reasoning to 
Medicare write-offs in Rose v. Via Christi Health Systems, Inc. (Rose I)76 
                                                     
 66. See infra Part II.A.3.a (discussing the benefit-of-the-bargain approach). 
 67. See infra Part II.A.3.b (discussing the actual-amount-paid approach). 
 68. See infra Part II.A.3.c (discussing the reasonable-value approach). 
 69. The author borrows the names of these three approaches from Bozeman v. State, 879 So. 2d 
692, 701–05 (La. 2004). 
 70. Id. at 702. 
 71. Id. at 706. 
 72. Id.; see also supra note 49 and accompanying text (noting that Medicaid recipients 
generally do not pay premiums). 
 73. Bozeman, 879 So. 2d at 706. 
 74. See Acuar v. Letourneau, 531 S.E.2d 316, 322 (Va. 2000) (justifying the plaintiff’s 
recovery of the write-off by explaining “those amounts written off are as much of a benefit for which 
[the plaintiff] paid consideration as are the actual cash payments made by his health insurance carrier 
to the health care providers”). 
 75. Id. at 323. 
 76. 78 P.3d 798, 806 (2003), modified on reh’g, 113 P.3d 241 (Kan. 2005).  The Kansas 
Supreme Court subsequently modified Rose I; in its new 2005 decision, the court did not consider 
whether a plaintiff who pays premiums for Medicare benefits is entitled to receive the benefit of his 
bargain.  See infra note 193 (discussing Rose II). 
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and concluded that plaintiffs who pay premiums for Medicare benefits 
are entitled to the benefit of their bargain.77 
The Kansas District Court adopted the opposite extreme in 
Wildermuth v. Staton.78  That case presented the issue of whether 
plaintiffs are entitled to Medicare benefits.79  Although beneficiaries 
generally pay a premium for Medicare benefits,80 the court allowed the 
defendants to introduce evidence of the write-off, thereby effectively 
limiting the plaintiff’s recovery to the actual amount paid by Medicare.  
The court reasoned that the write-offs did not constitute a benefit the 
plaintiffs personally obtained or for which they individually bargained.81  
Instead, according to the court, federal law required the write-offs, and 
Medicare law and regulations prohibit medical service providers from 
seeking reimbursement for the write-offs from anyone.82  Thus, the court 
refused to award the Medicare write-off to the plaintiff.83 
b. Actual-Amount-Paid Approach 
Courts generally offer two reasons for allowing defendants to 
introduce evidence of write-offs.  First, because neither the plaintiff nor 
anyone else incurred the cost of the write-offs, the defendant ought to not 
incur the loss.  Expanding on this point, a Kansas court opined that 
allowing the plaintiff to receive the write-off is to fabricate a false 
presumption that the write-off constitutes a “payment.”84  Second, 
                                                     
 77. Rose I, 78 P.3d at 806. 
 78. No. Civ. A. 01-2418-CM, 2002 WL 922137 (D. Kan. Apr. 29, 2002). 
 79. Id. at *3. 
 80. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (noting that Medicare Part B beneficiaries 
generally pay premiums for their benefits). 
 81. Wildermuth, 2002 WL 922137, at *5. 
 82. Id. at *13–14. 
 83. Id.  The Ohio Supreme Court reached an even more surprising result in Hodge v. 
Middletown Hospital Ass’n, 581 N.E.2d 529, 532 (Ohio 1991).  The court awarded the write-off in a 
Medicare Part A case using a benefit-of-the-bargain analysis although Part A beneficiaries do not 
pay premiums.  The court justified its approach by noting the following: 
Medicaid payments . . . are significantly different from benefits paid as Medicare Part A.  
Medicaid is a system for providing payment of medical costs to the poor.  Neither the 
beneficiary nor his employer pays premiums or underwrites the cost of the program.  . . . 
Payment into the [Medicare] trust fund, though involuntary, is in exchange for health care 
coverage, and gives rise to a duty on the part of the government to pay benefits when 
required.  In addition, the language of the statute specifically refers to “policy or 
contract” of insurance.  In short, Medicare Part A is funded by payments made by 
beneficiaries and their employers, is actuarily determined, and is described by its 
enabling statute as insurance. 
Id. at 532–33 (emphasis omitted); see also supra note 49 and accompanying text (citing Hodge). 
 84. See Liberty v. Westwood United Super, Inc., No. 89,143, 2005 WL 1006363, at *5 (Kan. 
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because making the plaintiff whole is the goal of recovery, a write-off 
award would simply result in an unwarranted windfall to the plaintiff.85 
U.S. district courts in Kansas have expressly adopted these two 
rationales.  In Wildermuth, a case involving Medicare, the court offered 
two rationales when rejecting a distinction between Medicare and 
Medicaid as a basis for allowing the plaintiff to recover the write-off.  
First, the court emphasized the collateral source rule’s language, noting 
that “the collateral source rule, by its express terms, simply does not 
apply to write-offs of expenses that are never paid.”86  Second, the court 
justified its approach with the windfall rationale: “allowing a plaintiff to 
recover the amount of charges written-off would result in a windfall to 
the plaintiff.”87  Similarly, in Strahley v. Mercy Health Center,88 the 
Kansas District Court concluded plaintiffs cannot recover “losses” 
incurred by no one.89 
c. Reasonable-Value Approach 
Reasonableness as a standard has permeated American jurisprudence 
since its inception, and the collateral source rule has not escaped the 
standard’s reach.  In answering the write-off question, several 
jurisdictions use a reasonable-value approach, through which the court 
awards plaintiffs only the reasonable value of the medical expenses.90 
Ascertaining the definition of “reasonable value” presents the most 
troubling question regarding this approach.91  Courts primarily interpret 
this term of art in three fashions.  First, the reasonable value of the 
services represents the full amount of the services, including the write-
                                                                                                                       
Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2005) (“The application of [the collateral source] rule to mandatory Medicare 
discounts requires a great deal of creativity.  . . . [O]ne must fictionally characterize the mandatory 
contractual discount for Medicare patients as a ‘payment’ of medical expenses.  . . . No one is paid 
the discount . . . .”). 
 85. See Bozeman v. State, 879 So. 2d 692, 702 (La. 2004) (discussing various courts’ use of 
this approach). 
 86. Wildermuth, 2002 WL 922137, at *5. 
 87. Id. 
 88. No. Civ. A. 99-2439-KHV, 2000 WL 1745291 (D. Kan. Nov. 9, 2000). 
 89. Id. at *2. 
 90. See, e.g., Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149, 1157–60 (Haw. 2004) (applying the reasonable-
value standard); Haselden v. Davis, 579 S.E.2d 293, 295 (S.C. 2003) (noting a defendant who agrees 
to be a Medicaid provider and bills a Medicaid patient for the full value of the services “may not 
claim that the true, reasonable value of those services is the lesser amount paid by Medicaid.  
Accordingly . . . the amount billed by [a Medicaid provider is] relevant to establish the reasonable 
value of the services provided . . . .”); Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 630 N.W.2d 201, 209 (Wis. 2001) 
(“[W]hile the actual amount paid for medical services may reflect the reasonable value of the 
treatment rendered, the focus is on the reasonable value, not the actual charge.”). 
 91. Bynum, 101 P.3d at 1155. 
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offs.92  Second, converse to the first variation, the reasonable value of the 
services does not include the write-off.93  Third, both the amounts 
originally billed by the medical service provider and actually paid by the 
insurance company help fact finders calculate the reasonable value of the 
plaintiff’s medical expenses.94 
B. The Collateral Source Rule 
Having outlined the intricacies and relevant considerations of the 
write-off issue, this Subpart in part provides information necessary to 
understand whether the collateral source rule even applies to write-offs.  
This Subpart begins with the rule’s history95 and subsequently describes 
the Kansas legislature’s attempts to modify and abrogate the collateral 
source rule.96  An understanding of the rule’s beginnings and its troubled 
history is vital to a sound constitutional analysis of the Kansas 
legislature’s attempts to abrogate the collateral source rule. 
1. Inception: A Focus on the Rule’s Rationales 
Harding v. Town of Townsend97 gave birth to the term “collateral 
source.”98  Scholars nonetheless generally trace the concept’s inception 
to Propeller Monticello v. Mollison,99 a seminal mid-nineteenth-century 
                                                     
 92. See id. at 1161 (holding plaintiffs are entitled to recover the reasonable value of the medical 
services, and that this is the amount paid by the insurance company plus the write-off).  Perhaps, 
Bynum ought to be referred to as a “full-amount” approach.  The decision adduces two persuasive 
arguments.  First, the court used a syllogism: the collateral source rule allows plaintiffs to recover 
gratuitous payments; the write-off is a gratuitous payment by the physician to the plaintiff; therefore, 
the plaintiff should recover the write-off.  Id. at 1156.  Second, the court explained that “no 
precedent is overturned inasmuch as the issue at hand has not been decided in this jurisdiction.  
Indeed, none of the parties argue that a decision such as this one, consistent with other decisions 
reaching the same or similar results, would result in overturning Hawai‘i law.”  Id. at 1160 n.24. 
 93. See, e.g., Hanif v. Hous. Auth., 246 Cal. Rptr. 192, 193–97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding 
the amount paid by Medicaid caps the reasonable value of the medical services). 
 94. See, e.g., Haselden, 579 S.E.2d at 295 (“[W]e hold the amount billed by [the defendant] 
was relevant to establish the reasonable value of the services provided to Hill.”); see also Iles v. 
Autozone Stores, Inc., 12 F. App’x 627, 631 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he collateral source rule is a 
substantive state rule of evidence . . . .”). 
 95. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the collateral source rule’s history). 
 96. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 97. 43 Vt. 536 (1871). 
 98. See Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. Miller, 177 S.W.3d 676, 687 (Ky. 2005) (citing 
Harding) (“The policy of insurance is collateral to the remedy against the defendant, and was 
procured solely by the plaintiff at his expense, and to the procurement of which the defendant was in 
no way contributory.”). 
 99. 58 U.S. 152, 155 (1854); see also Douglas H. Schwartz, Comment, The Tortured Path of 
Ohio’s Collateral Source Rule, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 643, 643 (1997) (tracing the collateral source rule 
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Supreme Court of the United States decision in which the Court reasoned 
that a tortfeasor should not benefit from an injured party’s insurance 
benefits.100  “[R]egardless of the victim’s access to insurance benefits,” 
the Court “bound [the defendant] to make satisfaction for the injury.”101 
Although most jurisdictions subsequently embraced this ruling,102 
courts have often adopted various rationales to explain the collateral 
source rule.  According to some jurisdictions, the rule applies because 
courts should not force plaintiffs to transfer to tortfeasors the benefit of 
their bargain.103  The Tenth Circuit recognizes two additional rationales.  
First, if either a windfall must fall on the tortfeasor or the plaintiff must 
receive a double recovery, then public policy demands that courts not 
reward the tortfeasor for the plaintiff’s good fortune.104  Second, the rule 
encourages maintenance of insurance by assuring plaintiffs’ payments 
from collateral sources will not be reduced. 105  Most important for 
purposes of this Comment’s thesis, other courts emphasize the collateral 
source rule’s deterrent value.106 
2. From Fairness to Deterrence and Accountability: The Prevalent 
Kansas Rationales 
The Kansas Supreme Court first recognized the collateral source rule 
in Berry v. Dewey.107  Berry involved a wrongful death action brought by 
a mother who received a financial benefit resulting from her son’s 
death.108  The defendant argued that the trial court should have deducted 
the benefit from the verdict.109  Upholding the damages amount, the court 
called the defendant’s argument “untenable”110 and reasoned, without 
                                                                                                                       
back to Propeller Monticello v. Mollison). 
 100. See Propeller Monticello, 58 U.S. at 155 (“The defence set up in the answer, that the 
libellants have received satisfaction from the insurers, cannot avail the respondent. The contract with 
the insurer is in the nature of a wager between third parties, with which the trespasser has no 
concern.”). 
 101. Schwartz, supra note 99, at 643. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Amwest Sav. Ass’n v. Statewide Capital, Inc., 144 F.3d 885, 889 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. c. (1979)). 
 104. Green v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 59 F.3d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing 
FDIC v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 20 F.3d 1070, 1083 (10th Cir. 1994)). 
 105. Id. (citing Quinones v. Pa. Gen. Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1167, 1171 (10th Cir. 1986)). 
 106. See Bozeman v. State, 879 So. 2d 692, 700 (La. 2004) (“The underlying concept is that tort 
damages can help to deter unreasonably dangerous conduct.”). 
 107. 172 P. 27 (Kan. 1918). 
 108. Id. at 28. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 29. 
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further explanation, that the proposition “does not address itself to the 
judgment of this court as being sound, legal, equitable, or fair.”111  Thus, 
the Berry court did not adopt deterrence or accountability as the 
rationales of its decision. 
The rationale adopted by Kansas courts has since evolved.  Berry 
began with fairness, though the Berry court itself failed to answer why 
the collateral source rule produces “fair” results.112  Subsequent case law 
demonstrates the evolution of the fairness rationale.  Today, the Kansas 
collateral source rule’s underlying policies are twofold: accountability 
and deterrence.113  The idea that courts must hold the defendant liable for 
the full amount of damages he causes underlies the accountability 
policy.114  A tortfeasor unjustifiably escapes responsibility unless the 
collateral source rule holds him accountable.115  Kansas courts also 
generally emphasize the collateral source rule’s deterrent value.  These 
courts assume that a tortfeasor’s knowledge that the plaintiff’s insurance 
company will pay for the damages may diminish the tortfeasor’s 
incentive to act reasonably.116 
                                                     
 111. Id. at 29–30. 
 112. The court did little, if anything, to explain why allowing the defendant to introduce 
evidence of collateral source payments would be unfair.  Id. 
 113. While Kansas courts have not expressly rejected the “maintenance of insurance” rationale 
advanced by the Tenth Circuit, they have relentlessly relied on deterrence and accountability.  See 
infra notes 114–16 and accompanying text (discussing the twin rationales of the Kansas collateral 
source rule).  This suggests accountability and deterrence constitute the two strongest policies 
underlying the Kansas collateral source rule. 
 114. Young, supra note 3, at 138 (citing Bates v. Hogg, 921 P.2d 249, 255 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) 
(Rulon, J., dissenting)). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.  Rexroad v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 388 P.2d 832 (Kan. 1962), is a prime example 
of the deterrence principle.  There, the Kansas Supreme Court reasoned that the defendant could not 
introduce evidence of insurance benefits because “[t]he question of the right to the proceeds of the 
recovery is a matter between the insurer and the insured.”  Id. at 841.  The Kansas Supreme Court 
further explained “the contract of insurance and the subsequent conduct of the insurer and insured in 
relation thereto are matters with which the wrongdoer has no concern and which do not affect the 
measure of his liability.”  Id. at 842 (citing 15 AM. JUR. Damages § 210) (emphasis added).  
Rexroad’s reasoning has since resonated in Kansas jurisprudence.  See Zak v. Riffel, 115 P.3d 165, 
174 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005) (“The purpose of the collateral source rule is to prevent the tortfeasor from 
escaping full liability . . . .”); see also King Grain Co. v. Caldwell Mfg. Co., 820 F. Supp. 569, 573 
(D. Kan. 1993) (citing Rexroad, 388 P.2d at 842) (“The Kansas Supreme Court has held that a tort 
plaintiff’s damages are not diminished where the plaintiff is indemnified by insurance.”); Allman v. 
Holleman, 667 P.2d 296, 302 (Kan. 1983) (noting that, in action brought by children for the alleged 
wrongful death of their mother, “[t]he fact the children received some assistance from another source 
has nothing to do with the [pecuniary valuation of] services and support provided by [the mother] 
herself”). 
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3. Abrogation: Unconstitutional Discrimination? 
In response to a perceived nationwide medical malpractice crisis,117 
the Kansas legislature has repeatedly attempted to modify the Kansas 
collateral source rule.118  It first attempted to modify the rule in 1976.119  
Section 60-471120 granted a trier of fact the discretion to balance a 
reimbursement or indemnification provided by health maintenance 
organizations and additional evidence.121  Two points regarding this 
statute are worth noting: First, the legislature limited the statute’s scope 
to medical malpractice actions.122  Second, the legislature precluded 
consideration of insurance payments made by the insured or his 
employer, or by the injured party or his employer.123 
In Wentling v. Medical Anesthesia Services,124 the Kansas Supreme 
Court declared section 60-471 unconstitutional on equal protection 
grounds under both the United States and the Kansas Constitutions.125  
Applying a heightened level of scrutiny,126 the court stated that section 
                                                     
 117. See Bryan W. Smith, Note, The Medical Malpractice Insurance “Crisis”: Did Kansas Tort 
Reform Really Work?, 31 WASHBURN L.J. 106, 108–09 (1991) (commenting on the perceived 
medical malpractice crisis); see also Jordyn K. McAfee, Note, Medical Malpractice Crisis Factional 
or Fictional?: An Overview of the GAO Report as Interpreted by the Proponents and Opponents of 
Tort Reform, 9 J. MED. & L. 161, 163 (2005) (questioning the existence of a medical malpractice 
crisis). 
 118. See Eaton, supra note 2, at 916−19 (describing the three attempts of the Kansas legislature 
to modify the collateral source rule). 
 119. Id. at 916. 
 120. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-471(a)–(b) (1983) (repealed 1985). 
 121. See Eaton, supra note 2, at 916 (noting that § 60-471(a)–(b) allowed fact finders to accord 
“‘such weight as [they should] choose to ascribe to that evidence in determining the amount of 
damages to be awarded’”). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. 701 P.2d 939 (Kan. 1985). 
 125. Id. at 951; see also Eaton, supra note 2, at 916 (discussing Wentling). 
 126. The Kansas Supreme Court applied a heightened level of scrutiny because of the nature of 
the rights involved.  In justifying its choice of constitutional scrutiny, the court gave the following 
hypothetical about two patients: 
One is wealthy, and has insurance, while the other has no resources to pay for medical 
care and is uninsured.  The first is able to retain private nursing care, which is paid for by 
the insurance, while the second, needing the same continual care, is cared for by his wife, 
who was forced to quit her job to stay home and care for him.  It is said the modified 
collateral source rule would exclude evidence that the private nursing care for the first 
patient was in fact paid for by the insurance company, while the jury would be apprised 
of the fact that the second patient’s care was provided free by his wife, and perhaps she 
had been earning only the minimum wage at the job she left. 
Wentling, 701 P.2d at 950 (quoting Doran v. Priddy, 534 F. Supp. 30, 36 (D. Kan. 1981)).  However, 
as infra note 144 and its accompanying text clarify, the Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the write-
off issue under a rational basis standard in the last case on point.  This strongly suggests that any 
attempt by the Kansas legislature to abrogate or modify the rule will be subject to rational basis 
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60-471 discriminated in two ways: First, section 60-471 “discriminated 
among those parties claiming to have been injured by the wrongful 
conduct of another by treating those allegedly injured by a health care 
provider differently than those allegedly injured by someone other than a 
health care provider.”127  Also, the statute “discriminated between those 
who paid for or received by virtue of their employment certain benefits 
and those who received those benefits gratuitously.”128  The court 
explained that if in promulgating section 60-471 the legislature 
“‘intended to keep down the costs of medical malpractice insurance, and 
to limit the size of medical malpractice verdicts,’”129 the distinction 
between insured plaintiffs and “‘ones who must rely upon kindness for 
some of their pre-litigation care’”130 did not further that purpose.  Rather, 
it “‘substantially undermine[d] that purpose . . . at the expense of the 
indigent litigant’”131 and thus violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution as well as the Kansas Constitution.132 
Two legislative attacks followed Wentling.  In 1985, the Kansas 
legislature enacted section 60-3403,133 and, in 1988, the legislature 
passed sections 60-3801 to -3807.134  Section 60-3403 allowed evidence 
of benefits received by any claimant, including insurance coverage, 
workers’ compensation, and social welfare benefit programs.135  The 
statute also permitted a claimant to present evidence of any amount paid 
in obtaining those benefits, and “the trier of fact would offset the 
claimant’s expenses against the amount the claimant received from the 
benefits.”136  Nonetheless, the Kansas Supreme Court declared section 
60-3403 unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Kansas Constitution.137  In Farley v. Engelken,138 the court’s rationale 
clarified the court’s firm belief that the statute’s distinction between 
those with and without insurance served only to wrongly discriminate  
 
                                                                                                                       
review. 
 127. Eaton, supra note 2, at 916–17. 
 128. Id. at 917. 
 129. Wentling, 701 P.2d at 950 (quoting Doran, 534 F. Supp. at 37). 
 130. Id. (quoting Doran, 534 F. Supp. at 37). 
 131. Id. (quoting Doran, 534 F. Supp. at 37). 
 132. Id. at 950–51. 
 133. Act of Apr. 26, 1985, ch. 197, § 3, 1985 Kan. Sess. Laws 953. 
 134. Act of May 17, 1988, ch. 222, §§ 1–7, 1988 Kan. Sess. Laws 1334–36. 
 135. Eaton, supra note 2, at 917. 
 136. Id. at 917–18. 
 137. Id. at 918. 
 138. 740 P.2d 1058 (Kan. 1987). 
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and thus did “not substantially further a legitimate legislative 
objective.”139 
Sections 60-3801 to -3807 encountered a similar fate.  According to 
these statutes, where a personal injury claimant sought more than 
$150,000 in damages, “evidence of collateral source benefits received or 
evidence of collateral source benefits which are reasonably expected to 
be received in the future shall be admissible.”140  Sections 60-3801 to -
3807 authorized the claimant to introduce evidence of the cost of the 
collateral sources and required the trier of fact to reduce the judgment by 
the amount of the collateral source benefits minus the benefits’ cost.141 
Again, the Kansas Supreme Court, in Thompson v. KFB Insurance 
Co.,142 held the statute modifying the rule unconstitutional under the 
United States and the Kansas Constitutions.143  This time using a rational 
basis standard of review, the court explained that “[e]ven assuming the 
objective of cutting insurance costs is a legitimate legislative goal, . . . 
the only basis for the [$150,000] classification is to deny a benefit to one 
group for no purpose other than to discriminate against that group.”144  
As such, the classification represents an “arbitrary” and thus 
unconstitutional attempt by the legislature.145 
4. Senate Bill 335 
The Kansas legislature recently attempted to abrogate the collateral 
source rule in all personal injury claims,146 a move that could have 
significantly altered Kansas personal injury law.  Section 1 of the bill 
proposes to abrogate the rule in “any action,” regardless of the plaintiff’s 
damages.147  Section 2 amends the previous statute to allow, but not 
require, fact finders to calculate the net collateral source benefits.148  If 
the jury is the fact finder, and the jury makes the calculation, the bill 
requires the jury to itemize its verdict.149  Following this calculation, the 
                                                     
 139. Eaton, supra note 2, at 918 (citing Farley, 740 P.2d at 1068). 
 140. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3802 (2005). 
 141. Eaton, supra note 2, at 919. 
 142. 850 P.2d 773 (Kan. 1993). 
 143. Id. at 779. 
 144. Id. at 782. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See S. 335, 2005–06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2006) (attempting to remove requirement of 
$150,000 in damages from KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3802 (2005)). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
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bill requires the court to reduce the verdict by the amount of the 
plaintiff’s collateral source benefits.150 
Although the bill died in committee, its substance begs an important 
question: Had it passed, would Kansas courts have condoned this 
legislative effort?  One commentator recently attempted to provide 
answers to these questions.  One can summarize her constitutional 
arguments as follows: even if the legislature had enacted Senate Bill 335, 
courts would have declared it unconstitutional because abrogation (1) 
lacks a rational legislative basis absent a medical malpractice crisis,151 
(2) violates plaintiffs’ constitutional right to a remedy,152 and (3) 
infringes upon plaintiffs’ equal protection guarantee.153 
C. What Kansas Courts Have Not Said About Medicare and Medicaid 
Write-Offs 
While Kansas legislators struggle with the collateral source rule, 
Kansas courts attempt to clarify Kansas law on Medicare and Medicaid 
write-offs.  However, these judicial attempts have failed.  In Bates v. 
Hogg,154 the Kansas Court of Appeals held that, where Medicaid is at 
issue, plaintiffs are entitled only to receive the actual amount paid to 
their medical service providers.155  Subsequently, the Kansas Supreme 
Court distinguished Bates from Rose v. Via Christi Health System, Inc. 
(Rose I), 156 a 2003 decision noting that plaintiffs are entitled to receive 
Medicare write-offs because Medicare charges premiums to its 
beneficiaries.157  The court then granted a motion to rehear Rose I,158 thus 
planting the seed for confusion among practitioners. 
Before the Kansas Supreme Court reheard Rose I, the Kansas Court 
of Appeals decided Fischer v. Farmers Insurance Co.159 and Liberty v. 
                                                     
 150. Id. 
 151. Young, supra note 3, at 167−68. 
 152. Id. at 168−69. 
 153. Id. at 169.  This Comment addresses the soundness of each of these constitutional 
arguments infra in Part III.C. 
 154. 921 P.2d 249 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996), superseded in part by statute, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-
226(b), (e), -237(c) (2005), as recognized in Frans v. Gausman, 6 P.3d 432, 440 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2000). 
 155. Bates, 921 P.2d at 253. 
 156. 78 P.3d 798 (Kan. 2003), modified on reh’g, 113 P.3d 241 (Kan. 2005). 
 157. Id. at 806. 
 158. Liberty v. Westwood United Super, Inc., No. 89,143, 2005 WL 1006363, at *5 (Kan. Ct. 
App. Apr. 29, 2005). 
 159. No. 90, 246, 2005 WL 400404, at *5 (Kan. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2005). 
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Westwood United Super, Inc.160  Noting that through its grant of a motion 
for rehearing the Kansas Supreme Court had suspended Rose I’s 
precedential value, the Kansas Court of Appeals applied Bates to private 
insurance benefits.161  Similarly, the Liberty court extended Bates to 
Medicare.162  The new Rose v. Via Christi Health Systems, Inc. (Rose 
II)163 decision did little to settle the law.  Refusing to settle the discord 
between Bates, on one hand, and Fischer and Liberty, on the other, the 
Kansas Supreme Court limited Rose II to cases where the tortfeasor was 
both the defendant and the medical service provider.164 
In Bates, the plaintiff and defendant were involved in an accident.165  
Before trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to limit the 
plaintiff’s evidence of economic damages to the amount paid by 
Medicaid on the plaintiff’s behalf.166  Reversing the trial court’s grant of 
the motion, the appellate court firmly stated the collateral source rule did 
not apply to Medicaid write-offs.167  Instead, because a medical service 
provider cannot charge Medicaid patients for the write-off, the actual 
amount paid by Medicaid constitutes the “customary charge” and thus 
constitutes the only amount recoverable by the plaintiff.168 
In the Medicare context, the write-off issue first arose in the Rose 
decisions.  Bates and Rose shared similar facts, subject to two main 
distinctions: Rose involved Medicare,169 and the Rose defendant played 
the roles of both tortfeasor and medical service provider.170  In Rose, the 
decedent injured himself while under the defendant’s care.171  After this 
injury, the defendant hospital continued to treat the decedent.172  The 
defendant hospital “billed [the decedent] and his insurer, Medicare, for 
                                                     
 160. 2005 WL 1006363, at *6. 
 161. Fischer, 2005 WL 400404, at *5. 
 162. Liberty, 2005 WL 1006363, at *5. 
 163. 113 P.3d 241 (Kan. 2005). 
 164. Id. at 248. 
 165. Bates v. Hogg, 921 P.2d 249, 251 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996), superseded in part by statute, 
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-226(b), (e), -237(c) (2005), as recognized in Frans v. Gausman, 6 P.3d 432, 
440 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000). 
 166. Bates, 921 P.2d at 251. 
 167. Id. at 253. 
 168. Id. 
 169. For reasons explained in Part III.B.1, the premium distinction between Medicare and 
Medicaid affects the analysis under the benefit-of-the-bargain approach. 
 170. See Rose v. Via Christi Health Sys., Inc. (Rose I), 78 P.3d 798, 800 (Kan. 2003) (noting 
that the plaintiff claimed Via Christi, the decedent’s medical service provider, was negligent in 
treating the decedent), modified on reh’g, 113 P.3d 241 (Kan. 2005). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Rose v. Via Christi Health Sys., Inc. (Rose II), 113 P.3d 241, 243 (Kan. 2005). 
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the full cost of [the decedent’s] treatment.”173  Pursuant to an agreement 
with Medicare, the defendant hospital wrote off $154,193.24 of the 
$242,104.84 it originally billed.174  Medicare paid the difference.175 
At trial, the plaintiff alleged the defendant hospital had been 
negligent in treating the decedent.176  The court held in favor of the 
plaintiff on the negligence issue.177  Similarly, the trial court determined 
that Bates was inapplicable to Medicare write-offs and admitted into 
evidence the defendant hospital’s initial bill of $242,104.84.178  On 
appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court considered whether the defendant 
hospital may introduce evidence of Medicare write-offs.179  
Distinguishing Rose from Bates (and thus distinguishing Medicare from 
Medicaid for purposes of write-off analysis), the appellate court held that 
the plaintiff should receive the write-off because he had bargained for the 
Medicare benefit.180  Thereafter, the Kansas Supreme Court granted a 
motion to rehear Rose.181 
Before the Kansas Supreme Court issued its new opinion, a three-
judge panel of the Kansas Court of Appeals issued two relevant 
unpublished decisions: Fischer v. Farmers Insurance Co.182 and Liberty 
v. Westwood United Super, Inc.183  In Fisher, the plaintiff sued her 
private insurance company after an accident in an attempt to recover 
under her policy’s underinsured coverage provision.184  Applying Bates, 
the trial court excluded evidence of the private insurance write-off.185  
The plaintiff appealed, but the appellate court affirmed, explaining that 
“the language employed in the Bates majority suggests that its holding 
                                                     
 173. Rose I, 78 P.3d at 800. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Rose v. Via Christi Health Sys., Inc. (Rose II), 113 P.3d 241, 243 (Kan. 2005). 
 179. The defendant hospital filed a cross-appeal in the event the appellate court reversed the trial 
court’s grant of the motion to offset.  Rose I, 78 P.3d at 802.  The write-off issue is the crux of the 
cross-appeal in Rose I. 
 180. See id. at 806 (“Because health care providers voluntarily contract with Medicare in the 
same manner as they contract with other private insurers for reduced rates, the benefit of the write-
offs should be attributed to the Medicare participant rather than the health care provider.”).  This 
distinction was based on a contractual, benefit-of-the-bargain, analysis: Medicare, unlike Medicaid, 
generally requires its beneficiaries to pay premiums.  Id. at 803. 
 181. Liberty v. Westwood United Super, Inc., No. 89,143, 2005 WL 1006363, at *5 (Kan. Ct. 
App. Apr. 29, 2005). 
 182. No. 90, 246, 2005 WL 400404, at *4 (Kan. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2005). 
 183. 2005 WL 1006363, at *5. 
 184. Fisher, 2005 WL 400404, at *1. 
 185. Id. 
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was not principally driven by the fact that the write-off was mandated by 
a Medicaid contract.”186  The same three-judge panel decided Liberty.  In 
language almost verbatim to that in Fischer,187 the Liberty court extended 
Bates to Medicare write-offs.188 
The Fischer and Liberty appellate court clearly expected the Kansas 
Supreme Court to answer the write-off question.189  However, the Kansas 
Supreme Court did little to meet these expectations.  Instead of solving 
this question, the court left the write-off issue undecided by limiting Rose 
II to cases where the tortfeasor plays the roles of both the defendant and 
the medical service provider.190 
In what one commentator has named a “disconnect between the 
Kansas Court of Appeals and the Kansas Supreme Court,”191 the 
preceding cases set the groundwork for uncertainty.  Presently, a 
defendant may introduce evidence of write-offs.  Per Bates, the “amount 
due” is the actual amount paid because the medical service provider 
cannot charge Medicaid patients for the write-off.192  Similarly, under 
Rose II, a defendant may introduce evidence of write-offs if the 
tortfeasor is both the defendant and the medical service provider.193  
While Rose I purported to limit Bates to Medicaid cases,194 Rose II 
brings to question the precedential value of this distinction.195 
                                                     
 186. Id. at *2.  In Fischer, the Kansas Court of Appeals explained that, per Kansas Supreme 
Court Rule 7.06(a), “[t]he granting of the rehearing suspended the effect of the original decision 
until the matter is decided on rehearing.”  Id. at *5. 
 187. See Liberty, 2005 WL 1006363, at *5 (explaining that because Rose I was scheduled for 
rehearing, the court of appeals could apply Bates to Medicare write-offs). 
 188. Id. at *5–6.  The court specifically noted: 
[T]he issue presented is not the applicability of the collateral source rule, but rather “the 
reasonable value of medical care and expenses for the treatment of [the victim’s] 
injuries.”  . . . [T]he amount permitted to be charged to Medicare patients is the 
“customary charge” for their medical treatment and, thus, represents the reasonable value 
of their damages attributable to medical expenses. 
Id. (quoting Bates).   
 189. See id. at *6 (“Perhaps by the time this matter is retried, the district court will have the 
benefit of a final decision in the Rose case.  If not, the district court’s application of Bates would be 
legally and logically sound.”). 
 190. Rose v. Via Christi Health Sys., Inc. (Rose II), 113 P.3d 241, 248 (Kan. 2005). 
 191. Young, supra note 3, at 152. 
 192. Bates v. Hogg, 921 P.2d 249, 253 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996), superseded by statute on other 
grounds, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-226(b), (c), -237(c) (1999), as recognized in Frans v. Gausman, 6 
P.3d 432, 440 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000). 
 193. See Rose II, 113 P.3d at 246 (condoning the trial court’s decision to allow a credit against 
the plaintiff’s damages award for the medical expenses written off by Medicare). 
 194. Rose v. Via Christi Health Sys., Inc. (Rose I), 78 P.3d 798, 802 (Kan. 2003). 
 195. Rose II, 113 P.3d at 248. 
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Nevertheless, the Kansas Court of Appeals concluded in Fisher and 
Liberty that Bates applies to all write-offs.196  The court further noted 
that the actual amount paid constitutes the reasonable value.197  Taking 
these decisions at face value, their practical result is simple: if the 
collateral source rule is inapposite to all write-offs, and the reasonable 
value of the services comprises the actual amount paid to the medical 
service provider, then no plaintiff may recover more than the actual 
amount paid to the medical service provider.198 
The history, approaches, and details of the collateral source rule in 
the Medicare and Medicaid contexts highlight the rule’s complications.  
Making effective use of these tools, Kansas must mold a rule that will 
respect both the rule’s policies and the Kansas Constitution. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Kansas courts have blatantly ignored the collateral source rule’s 
policies.  Absent a consideration of the policies underlying the collateral 
source rule, the application of any of the three approaches yields a legal 
rule improperly divorced from its roots.  This is exactly the type of rule 
Kansas courts have sired—the rationale that courts should not hold 
defendants fully liable merely because neither the defendant nor his 
insurance company incurred the loss carelessly disrespects the rule’s 
purpose. 
Specifically challenging this payment rationale, this Part proposes 
three arguments.  First, because policies of deterrence and accountability 
                                                     
 196. Liberty v. Westwood United Super, Inc., No. 89,143, 2005 WL 1006363, at *5 (Kan. Ct. 
App. Apr. 29, 2005).  The Fisher court explained it was not bound by Rose I because the Kansas 
Supreme Court had granted a motion for rehearing prior to oral arguments in Fisher: 
Obviously, our Supreme Court’s [Rose I] majority decision would mandate that we 
reverse and remand in this case.  However, prior to the oral arguments in our case, the 
Supreme Court granted a motion for rehearing or modification and set oral arguments on 
that motion . . . .  Thus, we are not currently bound by that decision . . . .  [W]e now 
choose to proceed, based upon the currently effective precedent of Bates and upon our 
firm belief that the collateral source rule has no place in the determination of the proper 
measure of damages to be applied to all plaintiffs’ economic damages. 
Fisher v. Farmers Ins. Co., No. 90, 246, 2005 WL 400404, at *5 (Kan. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2005). 
 197. See Liberty, 2005 WL 1006363, at *5 (citing Bates, 921 P.2d at 253) (“In short, the issue 
presented is not the applicability of the collateral source rule, but rather ‘the reasonable value of the 
medical care’ . . . .  [T]he amount permitted to be charged to Medicare patients is the ‘customary 
charge’ for their medical treatment and, thus, represents the reasonable value of their damages 
attributable to medical expenses.”). 
 198. See Fisher, 2005 WL 400404, at *2 (“The principle of restoration should be applicable to 
all plaintiffs, regardless of whether they be uninsured, covered by Medicaid, covered by Medicare, 
covered by an employer’s group health policy, or covered by an individually purchased private 
insurance contract.”). 
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underlie the Kansas collateral source rule, the rule applies to write-offs 
regardless of whether anyone has paid them.199  Second, a corollary of 
the first argument, the rule’s policies demand a reasonable-value 
approach that allows courts to award plaintiffs the original amount billed 
by their medical service providers.200  Third, responding to a 
commentator’s constitutional challenges to Senate Bill 335,201 this Part 
concludes that the Kansas legislature possesses the constitutional 
authority to abrogate the collateral source rule.202  However, in order to 
show that the collateral source rule is not bullet-proof, this Part 
ultimately discusses suggestions to strengthen legislative attempts to 
abrogate the rule against constitutional challenges.203 
A. Deterrence and Punishment: A Top-Down Approach to the Kansas 
Collateral Source Rule 
1. A Theoretical Framework 
Many note that the plaintiff has received an undeserved windfall at 
the defendant’s expense if the court includes a write-off in the plaintiff’s 
damages award.204  Why, in other words, should the tortfeasor pay the 
plaintiff damages that neither he nor anyone else incurred?205  After all, 
the collateral source rule states that “payments from a collateral source 
shall not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from the 
wrongdoer.”206  Two policy prongs generally compose the 
counterargument.  First, courts should not relieve the defendant from 
liability merely because no one paid the benefit.  Second, if either the  
 
                                                     
 199. See infra Part III.A. 
 200. See infra Part III.B. 
 201. See supra notes 151−53 and accompanying text (summarizing Young’s constitutional 
arguments). 
 202. See infra Part III.C. 
 203. See infra Part III.D. 
 204. See, e.g., Wildermuth v. Staton, No. Civ. A. 01-2418-CM, 2002 WL 922137, at *5 (D. Kan. 
Apr. 29, 2002) (explaining that “as the Kansas Court of Appeals noted in Bates, allowing a plaintiff 
to recover the amount of charges written-off would result in a windfall to the plaintiff.  . . . ‘[T]he 
basic principle of damages is to make a party whole by putting it back in the same position, not to 
grant a windfall.’” (quoting Stephan v. Wolfenbarger & McCully, P.A., 690 P.2d 380, 385 (Kan. 
1984))). 
 205. See Strahley v. Mercy Health Ctr. of Manhattan, Inc., No. Civ. A. 99-2439-KHV, 2000 WL 
1745291, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 9, 2000) (“No one, including plaintiffs, is liable for the amount of the 
write-offs.  Therefore, they do not represent actual losses.”). 
 206. Rose v. Via Christi Health Sys., Inc. (Rose II), 113 P.3d 241, 246 (Kan. 2005) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 765 A.2d 786, 790 (Pa. 2001)). 
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defendant or the plaintiff must receive a windfall, justice demands that 
the plaintiff—not the defendant—profit from the collateral source.207 
A more sound and less hasty response would look to the rule’s 
foundation, seeking to determine the purpose of the rule and applying 
that purpose to the facts at issue.  One might then pose the question: 
Does the purpose of the collateral source rule suggest either the 
defendant’s conduct or the defendant herself should be covered?  If so, 
then the collateral source rule should apply, notwithstanding any 
technicalities in the manner of payment or the collateral source’s 
language itself.  If not, then the court should not apply the collateral 
source rule to the defendant or her conduct and should, instead, allow her 
to introduce evidence of the collateral source’s benefit or payment to the 
plaintiff.  Much like original intent constitutional analysis, this 
framework allows practitioners to see a rule from the “top,” or the policy, 
and apply that policy “down,” or to the facts.208 
This framework requires academics and practitioners to determine 
the collateral source rule’s rationales.  Courts generally advance two 
justifications, the first based on deterrence and accountability, 209 and the 
second based on a benefit-of-the-bargain theory.210  Additionally, some 
commentators suggest a hidden function of the rule—“to assist plaintiffs’ 
attorneys in financing lawsuits, since deducting insurance proceeds or 
government benefits from damages would reduce the size of the 
contingency fees available.”211 
2. Payment or No Payment?: The Collateral Source Rule’s 
Applicability to Write-offs in Light of Deterrence and Accountability 
Kansas courts hold that where no one pays for the benefits, the 
collateral source rule does not apply.  In Bates v. Hogg,212 the Kansas 
Court of Appeals noted that where Medicaid is at issue, the plaintiff is 
                                                     
 207. Schonberger v. Roberts, 456 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Iowa 1990). 
 208. The author would like to thank Professor Scott Optican from the University of Auckland 
Law School in New Zealand for the “top-down” terminology. 
 209. John C. Moorhouse et al., Law & Economics and Tort Law: A Survey of Scholarly Opinion, 
62 ALB. L. REV. 667, 688 (1998). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 688 n.121 (“[T]he collateral, source rule ‘is in fact retained . . . on the basis of its 
value in financing personal injury litigation.’” (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
REMEDIES § 8.10, at 584 (1973))). 
 212. 921 P.2d 249 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996), superseded by statute on other grounds, KAN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 60-226(b), (e), -237(c) (1999), as recognized in Frans v. Gausman, 6 P.3d 432, 440 (Kan. 
Ct. App. 2000). 
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not entitled to submit evidence of write-offs.213  Unfortunately, the court 
provided little analysis in reaching its decision.  Instead, the court merely 
stated that “[n]othing in the reasoning underlying the collateral source 
rule supports [the plaintiff’s] position on this issue.”214 
Wildermuth v. Staton215 provides an example of this payment 
rationale.  There, the Kansas District Court extended Bates to Medicare 
write-offs and justified its decision on the lack of payment.216  The court 
concluded that, because no one paid for the write-off, the collateral 
source rule did not entitle the plaintiff to receive Medicare write-offs.217  
Taken to its logical extreme, Wildermuth would likely extend Bates to 
private insurance write-offs,218 thereby limiting a plaintiff’s recovery to 
the actual amount paid to the medical service provider, regardless of the 
program at issue. 
As a matter of policy, the payment distinction stands on thin 
ground.219  Where the two primary policies underlying the Kansas 
collateral source rule are deterrence and accountability,220 a third party’s 
payments or lack thereof should not determine the defendant’s liability.  
                                                     
 213. Id. at 253. 
 214. Id. 
 215. No. Civ. A. 01-2418-CM, 2002 WL 922137 (D. Kan. Apr. 29, 2002). 
 216. Id. at *5 (citing Wentling v. Med. Anesthesia Servs., P.A., 701 P.2d 939, 949 (Kan. 1985)) 
(“[T]he collateral source rule, by its express terms, simply does not apply to write-offs of expenses 
that are never paid.  The collateral source rule only excludes ‘evidence of benefits paid by a 
collateral source.’”). 
 217. Id. at *8. 
 218. A syllogism clarifies this point: the Wildermuth court’s decision hinges on whether 
someone actually paid the write-off.  Plaintiffs never pay write-offs, even when they are insured 
under private insurance; by definition, write-offs are written off.  Thus, if payment is a precondition 
of an economic damages award, plaintiffs will never receive write-offs, regardless of the benefit 
program or insurance company. 
 219. Arguably, the Wildermuth court misinterpreted the language upon which it relied.  In noting 
that the collateral source rule only excludes evidence “paid” by collateral sources, the Wildermuth 
court cited Wentling v. Medical Anesthesia Services, P.A., 701 P.2d 939 (Kan. 1985), a case where 
the Kansas Supreme Court declared the first legislative attempt to abrogate the collateral source rule 
unconstitutional.  Id. at *5.  In Wentling, the Kansas Supreme Court noted: 
“The collateral source rule permits an injured party to recover full compensatory damages 
from a tortfeasor irrespective of the payment of any element of those damages by a 
source independent of the tortfeasor.  The rule also precludes admission of evidence paid 
by a collateral source rule, except where such evidence clearly carries probative value on 
an issue not inherently related to measurement of damages.” 
Wentling, 701 P.2d at 949  (emphasis added) (quoting 3 MINZER, NATES, KIMBALL, AXELROD & 
GOLDSTEIN, DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 17.00, at 17-5 (1984)). 
Nevertheless, the Kansas District Court concluded that the plaintiff’s receipt of the Medicare 
write-off depends on whether someone had actually paid the write-off.  Wildermuth’s adamant 
emphasis on the payment/nonpayment distinction directly contradicts the “irrespective of the 
payment” language of the Wentling court.  Thus, Wildermuth’s reliance on Wentling is misplaced. 
 220. See supra note 113. 
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The payment distinction is arbitrary, particularly when viewed through a 
policy lens. 
A policy look at the collateral source rule as applicable to gratuitous 
benefits clarifies this point.  Assume the plaintiff in the above 
illustration221 lacks insurance.  Assume further that one of the plaintiff’s 
relatives pays the plaintiff’s medical bill.  The collateral source rule 
demands the defendant pay the entire amount originally owed by the 
plaintiff to the medical service provider, notwithstanding the payment by 
the plaintiff’s relative.  However, if the plaintiff’s relative obtains a 
discount from the medical service provider resulting from his own 
negotiation, the collateral source rule still demands the defendant pay the 
full amount.  The policies of deterrence and accountability demand that 
the court not diminish the defendant’s culpability by a third-party 
discount. 
Indeed, Bates failed to consider the collateral source rule’s policies.  
In Kansas, deterrence and accountability constitute the Kansas collateral 
source rule’s two primary policies.222  Thus, courts apply the collateral 
source rule under the assumption that deterrence embodies an important 
economic value.  For example, if an insurance policy entitles A to 
receive $10,000 for an injury, and the defendant negligently injures A, 
under the collateral source rule A will receive $10,000 from the 
insurance policy and $10,000 from the defendant, provided A did not 
contractually subrogate his rights to the insurance company.223  A policy 
of tortfeasor accountability also strengthens the plaintiff’s case.224  
Whether the plaintiff’s insurance company paid for the write-off is 
factually irrelevant to the defendant’s culpability.  The defendant’s 
negligence or intent in causing the tort does not change merely because a 
plaintiff obtained insurance or health benefits.  As with deterrence, the 
payment is inapposite to the defendant’s culpability.225 
                                                     
 221. See supra Part II.A.2 (illustrating the dynamic among the collateral source rule, 
subrogation, and Medicare and Medicaid write-offs). 
 222. See supra note 113. 
 223. Judge Posner provides an economic analysis of this scenario: 
To permit the defendant to set up [the plaintiff’s] insurance policy as a bar to the action 
would result in underdeterrence.  The economic cost of the accident, however defrayed, is 
$10,000, and if the judgment against him is zero, his incentive to spend up to $10,000 
(discounted by the probability of occurrence) to prevent a similar accident in the future 
will be reduced. 
POSNER, supra note 17, at 201. 
 224. See supra note 113 (noting that accountability constitutes one of the collateral source rule’s 
primary policies). 
 225. The analysis differs if the collateral source rule’s desired function is, as some commentators 
have suggested, the assistance of plaintiffs and their attorneys in financing lawsuits.  See supra note 
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This does not imply the payment is irrelevant for all purposes.  To 
most versions of the collateral source rule, the payment possesses legal 
weight insofar as it allows the fact finder to determine whether the payor, 
or the source of the benefit, is independent of the defendant.  The facts in 
Rose226 serve as an example.  There, the hospital played the roles of both 
the defendant and the medical service provider.227  Focusing on this 
factual distinction, the Rose II court noted that the collateral source rule 
only applies where the defendant and the payor are independent of each 
other.228 
B.  An Analysis of the Three Approaches 
Through lenses of deterrence and accountability, a top-down analysis 
leads to a single conclusion: A distinction between paid and unpaid 
write-offs is irrelevant because their payment or nonpayment does not 
alter the applicability of the deterrence and accountability policies to the 
defendant’s liability.  However, the notion that the collateral source rule 
applies to write-offs in the absence of a legislative enactment ordering 
otherwise does not end the legal inquiry.  The question of whether the 
collateral source rule necessarily precludes defendants from introducing 
evidence of write-offs remains unanswered. 
This question is crucial.  Because its answer may be “no,” this issue 
will ultimately determine whether the plaintiff receives them.  If the 
collateral source rule, by mere virtue of its applicability, prohibits 
introduction of evidence of write-offs, then the plaintiff ought to recover 
the original amount billed by his medical service provider.  Some courts 
have held the opposite.  Even if applicable, these courts hold that the rule 
does not impose on the court a duty to award to the plaintiff the original 
                                                                                                                       
211 and accompanying text (describing the financing-litigation policy).  If the policy starting point is 
the financing of litigation, then one cannot as easily make the case that the payment distinction is 
inapposite.  Here, the plaintiff’s recovery of the actual amount paid arguably consummates the 
financing-litigation policy.  After all, once the plaintiff recovers an additional monetary amount—the 
double damages award—but does not receive the write-off, the plaintiff can much more easily 
finance the litigation.  Viewed under this policy, a court that allows the plaintiff to receive the write-
off may often award the plaintiff more than the cost of litigation, thereby exceeding the purported 
benefit of the financing-litigation policy.  However, courts generally do not subscribe to this policy.  
Even assuming that a court follows this rationale, the plaintiff’s recovery of the original amount 
billed by the medical service provider would more strongly achieve the policy’s purpose of aiding 
plaintiffs and their attorneys in financing litigation. 
 226. See supra notes 169─81 and accompanying text (discussing the relevant facts of the Rose 
decisions). 
 227. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 228. Rose v. Via Christi Health Sys., Inc. (Rose II), 113 P.3d 241, 245–46 (Kan. 2005) (quoting 
Thompson v. KFB Ins. Co., 850 P.2d 773, 776 (Kan. 1993)). 
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amount billed by the medical service provider.229  In addressing this 
question, courts have used three general approaches.230  Of these, only 
the reasonable-value approach respects both the collateral source rule’s 
underlying policies of accountability and deterrence and the Kansas 
Constitution. 
1. Protect the Rich, and Forget the Poor: The Benefit-of-the-Bargain 
Approach’s Shortcomings 
Through the benefit-of-the-bargain approach, plaintiffs may recover 
the original amount billed by their medical service providers only if their 
healthcare benefits bear contractual consideration.231  If, on the other 
hand, the benefits do not bear consideration, plaintiffs ought to recover 
only the actual amount paid to the medical service providers. 
This approach has encountered significant opposition within the 
courts.  This Comment emphasizes two of the approach’s most piercing 
critiques.  First, the approach irrationally discriminates among plaintiffs.  
Second, the approach could not survive scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Kansas Constitution.232 
Because the Medicare and Medicaid premium structures differ 
significantly,233 courts applying the benefit-of-the-bargain approach 
distinguish between the two programs.  Courts generally agree that a 
plaintiff who receives Medicaid benefits has not bargained for those 
benefits and, thus, the collateral source rule does not entitle her to the 
write-off.234  The same relative consistency does not hold true in 
Medicare cases.235  Most jurisdictions conclude that a beneficiary who 
chooses Medicare has paid premiums and, therefore, the collateral source 
rule entitles such beneficiary to collect the unpaid amount.236  In contrast, 
a minority holds that, although Medicare beneficiaries pay premiums, the  
 
                                                     
 229. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the approaches different jurisdictions have taken in 
resolving the collateral source issue). 
 230. See id. (discussing the benefit-of-the-bargain approach, the actual-amount-paid approach, 
and the reasonable-value approach to dealing with write-offs). 
 231. See supra Part II.A.3.a (discussing the benefit-of-the-bargain approach to write-offs). 
 232. Here, the benefit-of-the-bargain approach, not the collateral source’s abrogation, would 
likely violate the Equal Protection Clause.  This Comment discusses the equal protection 
implications for the collateral source rule and proposes a solution to anticipated constitutional 
problems infra in Part III.D. 
 233. See supra Part II.A.1.a (discussing Medicare and Medicaid’s payment structures). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
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collateral source rule does not entitle plaintiffs to recover Medicare 
write-offs because plaintiffs never actually bargained for their benefits.237 
This approach complicates the write-off issue and unnecessarily 
creates ambiguities for parties to exploit.  Even assuming that the 
collateral source rule generally entitles Medicare beneficiaries to receive 
the benefit of their bargain, a factual discussion reveals that, although 
courts adopting the benefit-of-the-bargain approach generally award 
Medicare beneficiaries the write-off, even Medicare beneficiaries seldom 
bargain for their benefit.  The Medicare beneficiary does not necessarily 
pay a premium—in fact, Medicare beneficiaries may obtain their 
programs for free if they have little income or resources.238  In these 
cases, the state pays the beneficiary’s premiums and might, in some 
cases, even pay the beneficiary’s deductibles and other medical 
expenses.  If the difference between a plaintiff who can recover the 
write-off and one who cannot is whether he has actually bargained for a 
benefit, then even some Medicare recipients may not be entitled to the 
write-off.239 
An often criticized aspect of the benefit-of-the-bargain approach is 
its inherent discrimination among beneficiaries from different programs 
and insurance companies.  Fischer clarifies this discrepancy.  There, the 
court noted “[t]he principle of restoration should be applicable to all 
plaintiffs, regardless of whether they be uninsured, covered by Medicaid, 
covered by Medicare, covered by an employer’s group health policy, or 
covered by an individually purchased private insurance contract.”240  
Hence the constitutional problem: In Kansas this distinction may actually 
violate equal protection.  The rationale that arbitrary discrimination 
among the injured violates the Kansas Constitution invalidates the 
benefit-of-the-bargain approach.  Applying Wentling, if the legislature, in 
modifying the collateral source rule, intends to both lower liability 
insurance costs and limit the size of personal injury verdicts, then the 
distinction between plaintiffs with Medicaid and those with Medicare or 
private insurance does not further the legislature’s purpose.241  The 
practical discrimination makes the constitutional problem obvious: 
                                                     
 237. Id. 
 238. See supra notes 46–49 (explaining Medicaid eligibility requirements). 
 239. Even in private insurance, an individual seldom bargains with the insurance company.  The 
assumption that a plaintiff may actually bargain with the government or with a private insurance 
company is a fiction.  Therefore, Kansas courts should not be captivated by the “fairness” and 
consistency mirage provided by the benefit-of-the-bargain approach. 
 240. Fischer v. Farmers Ins. Co., No. 90, 246, 2005 WL 400404, at *2 (Kan. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 
2005). 
 241. Id. 
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Medicaid beneficiaries, generally the poor and disabled,242 recover much 
less in economic damages than those with Medicare or private insurance.  
Under Wentling, Farley, and Thompson, courts cannot square such an 
inequitable and irrational framework with the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Kansas Constitution. 
2. Undermining the Collateral Source Rule Itself: The Actual-Amount-
Paid Approach 
In many courts, whether the plaintiff’s insurance company has paid 
the write-off is critical.  However, this distinction directly encroaches on 
the collateral source rule’s policies of deterrence and accountability.243  
To place the result in terms of the rule’s policies, a court allowing the 
plaintiff to only receive the actual amount paid to the medical service 
provider deters the defendant less than it would have otherwise and 
permits her to incur less of a loss than she would have but for the 
plaintiff’s insurance or government benefits.  The Kansas collateral 
source rule’s twin policies compel the opposite result.244 
3. Misplaced Criticisms: A Defense of the Reasonable-Value Approach 
In Koffman v. Leichtfuss,245 the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted 
the reasonable-value approach to address write-offs.  The court adopted 
this approach for three reasons.  First, applying “long-standing principles 
of Wisconsin law,”246 the court held a plaintiff may recover the 
reasonable value of the services rendered by his medical service 
provider;247 the focus, the court noted, is “on the reasonable value, not 
the actual charge.”248  Second, the court noted that a plaintiff’s damages 
                                                     
 242. See supra notes 46–49 (posing Medicaid eligibility requirements). 
 243. Neither has the Kansas legislature weakened the rationales of the collateral source rule.  At 
most, one may infer a desire to counter the perceived medical malpractice crisis from the 
legislature’s previous modifications of the rule.  One cannot with any certainty assume that the 
legislature seeks to weaken the policies of deterrence and accountability absent significant legislative 
history supporting its modifications of the rule or the abrogation of the collateral source rule. 
 244. See Part III.A.2 (making this point regarding the policies of deterrence and accountability in 
the write-off context). 
 245. 630 N.W.2d 201, 209 (Wis. 2001). 
 246. Id. at 208. 
 247. Id. at 209 (citing Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 611 N.W.2d 764 (Wis. 2000); Thoreson v. 
Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 201 N.W.2d 745 (Wis. 1972); McLaughlin v. Chi., Milwaukee, 
St. Paul & Pac. Ry. Co., 143 N.W.2d 32 (Wis. 1966)). 
 248. Id. 
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may not be reduced by third-party payments or benefits.249  Third, the 
court relied on the insurer’s right to subrogation, noting that because the 
insurer has a right to subrogation, the plaintiff will not attain a double 
recovery.250 
As long as policies of deterrence and accountability stand as the 
collateral source rule’s pillars, Kansas should apply the reasonable-value 
approach and allow the plaintiff to receive the original amount billed by 
the medical service provider.  Only in this situation does the burden fall 
where it should—on the defendant.  Again, a look at the illustration in 
Part II.2 helps one understand this argument.  The burden of the write-off 
must fall on someone.  If the court allows the plaintiff to receive the 
$15,000 write-off, the burden falls on the defendant.  Conversely, if the 
court denies the plaintiff the opportunity to obtain the write-off, the court 
will presumably relieve the defendant from some liability.  Thus, the 
plaintiff receives less than he would have had the collateral source rule 
mandated a write-off award.  The court relieves the defendant from 
$15,000 of liability—he ultimately pays $35,000.  The plaintiff earns 
nothing, and Medicare is, again, at a $0 balance because it automatically 
subrogates the $35,000 paid to the medical service provider.  The 
defendant, at least theoretically, pockets the medical service provider’s 
$15,000 concession. 
Even where courts have used the reasonable-value approach, they 
disagree as to what constitutes a “reasonable value.”  In defining 
“reasonable value,” courts utilize three variations.  First, the original 
amount billed by the medical service provider constitutes the reasonable 
value of the services.251  Second, the first variation’s antithesis: the 
reasonable value of the services does not include the write-off.252  Third, 
both the amount billed by the medical service provider and the amount 
paid by the insurance company are relevant to a factual determination of 
the services’ reasonable value.253 
However, criticisms focusing on the approach’s consequent 
inconsistency are misplaced.  While courts have applied this approach 
differently, a majority of jurisdictions has held that plaintiffs are entitled 
to the reasonable value of the services and that the original amount billed 
                                                     
 249. Id. 
 250. See id. at 212 (“[T]he insurer’s subrogation rights prevent a double recovery on the part of 
the plaintiff.”). 
 251. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 252. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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by the medical service provider constitutes this value.254  The ambiguous 
definition of “reasonable value” does not, in other words, cause these 
legal inconsistencies.  Rather, their bases lie in the courts’ 
misunderstanding of the deterrence doctrine, a misconception of—or 
perhaps a failure to consider—the legislature’s role in the public policy 
process, and a disregard of the collateral source rule’s policies.  
Inconsistency is not an issue if one assumes the collateral source rule 
entitles plaintiffs to receive write-offs absent a legislative abrogation or 
modification of the rule.  Otherwise, courts unjustly relieve the defendant 
from liability and significantly undermine the collateral source’s 
underlying policies of deterrence and accountability. 
C. The Kansas Constitution Does Not Preclude the Collateral Source 
Rule’s Abrogation 
Thus far, this Comment has arrived at the following conclusion: 
Absent a legislative rejection of the collateral source rule’s policies, 
deterrence and accountability demand a reasonable-value approach that 
allows courts to award plaintiffs the original amount billed by their 
medical service providers.  This Subpart deals with an equally important 
question: Can the Kansas legislature constitutionally abrogate the rule?  
A recently published Note concludes that the Kansas legislature neither 
should, as a policy matter, nor can, as a constitutional matter, abrogate 
the rule.255  Rather than answering whether the Kansas legislature should 
abrogate the rule,256 this Comment explores whether the legislature can, 
pursuant to the Kansas Constitution, do so.  Thus, this Subpart ultimately 
concludes that the legislature indeed possesses the constitutional power 
to abrogate the rule. 
                                                     
 254. See Robinson v. Bates, 828 N.E.2d 657, 663–69 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (surveying the law of 
several jurisdictions and concluding that the majority allows plaintiffs to recover the original amount 
billed by the medical service provider), discretionary appeal accepted, 835 N.E.2d 381 (Ohio 2005). 
 255. Young, supra note 3, at 167, 174. 
 256. Others have commented on this point.  See generally Eaton, supra note 2 (surveying three 
unsuccessful attempts by the Kansas legislature to modify the Kansas collateral source rule); Young, 
supra note 3 (discussing the collateral source rule, the Kansas legislature’s attempts to abrogate the 
rule, and probable impacts of such an abolition). 
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1. The Kansas Legislature Does Not Lack a Rational Basis to Abrogate 
the Collateral Source Rule 
Proponents of tort reform propose “facts” of a medical malpractice 
crisis in support of the collateral source rule’s abrogation.257  Three 
notions fuel the perception of a medical malpractice crisis: First, both the 
number of tort claims and the resulting jury verdicts have astronomically 
increased; second, frivolous suits outnumber legitimate ones; and, third, 
doctors leave states without tort reforms because they cannot afford 
liability premiums.258  According to one commentator, questionable 
evidence supports these claims.259  The commentator notes that because 
this legislative purpose is no longer rational, the rule’s abrogation cannot 
withstand constitutional scrutiny.260  Yet such a criticism ignores other 
reasons to abrogate the rule; the argument’s basic fallacy lies in its 
assumption that the inexistence of a medical malpractice crisis is the only 
rational basis to abrogate the rule. 
This Comment does not question the commentator’s conclusions 
regarding the inexistence of a medical malpractice crisis.  What this 
Comment does question is her argument’s disconnect between its 
evidence and conclusion.  Though sufficient, the existence of a medical 
malpractice crisis is not a necessary rational basis in the abrogation’s 
constitutional calculus.  Assuming arguendo that the medical malpractice 
crisis is an unfounded perception, the legislative acknowledgement of a 
weakening of the collateral source rule’s pillars of deterrence and 
accountability suffices as a rational basis for abrogation.261 
                                                     
 257. Young, supra note 3, at 161. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Calling into question these arguments, one commentator recently noted: 
The number of tort claims filed has actually decreased per capita over the last ten years.  
Additionally, the amounts awarded by juries have increased proportionally with increases 
in medical costs and general inflation.  Proponents of tort reform have also failed to 
produce evidence of the purported “frivolous” lawsuits.  . . . [And] [t]hreats that doctors 
are being forced to leave states without tort reforms are also unfounded. 
Id. at 161–62. 
 260. Id. at 167–68. 
 261. This Comment develops this argument infra in Part III.D. 
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2. The Collateral Source Rule’s Abrogation Does Not Necessarily 
Infringe on a Plaintiff’s Constitutional Right to a Remedy 
The collateral source rule’s abrogation does not necessarily infringe 
on a plaintiff’s constitutional right to a remedy.  While the Kansas 
Constitution states that “[a]ll persons, for injuries suffered in person, 
reputation or property, shall have remedy by due course of law,”262 it 
does not guarantee a right to double recoveries.  In Farley v. Engelken,263 
the Kansas Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether the 
challenged suit violated the right to a remedy.264  Nonetheless, a holding 
that the Kansas Constitution entitles plaintiffs to the write-offs 
necessarily implies that the Kansas Constitution’s right to a remedy 
requires courts to award the plaintiffs the double recovery imposed by 
the common law collateral source rule.  Notwithstanding the rule’s long-
standing and well-settled common law doctrine, the Constitution neither 
expressly nor implicitly guarantees a double recovery. 
3. The Collateral Source Rule’s Abrogation Does Not Infringe on a 
Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Guarantees 
Neither would the collateral source rule’s abrogation necessarily 
violate the Kansas Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.265  Some have 
argued that allowing a jury to hear evidence of the plaintiff’s insurance, 
but not evidence of the defendant’s, “violates the Equal Protection 
Clause by treating litigants unequally.”266  The argument depends on the 
premise that admissibility of evidence of insurance would inevitably 
prejudice juries.267 
However, one can easily see the logical fallacy in this straw man.  
The soundness of this equal protection argument depends on a single 
premise: If the Kansas legislature abrogates the collateral source rule, 
courts must allow juries to hear the evidence of collateral sources.  This 
assumption is at best questionable.  In fact, the Kansas legislature may 
couple its abrogation with a caveat—only the court, not the jury, may 
                                                     
 262. KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 18. 
 263. 740 P.2d 1058 (Kan. 1987). 
 264. Id. at 1064. 
 265. Contra Young, supra note 3, at 169 (stating the abolition of the collateral source rule will 
violate the Kansas Constitution’s equal protection guarantee). 
 266. Id. (emphasis added). 
 267. Id. 
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hear evidence of collateral sources.268  Effectively obviating jury 
prejudice, this approach would not violate the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Kansas Constitution. 
D. Can a Statute Abrogating the Kansas Collateral Source Rule Survive 
Constitutional Scrutiny? 
The abrogation of the collateral source rule, because of its societal 
impact, is bound to encounter ardent legislative and judicial opposition.  
At the legislative level, the opposition’s weapons will be its members’ 
written and spoken words.  However, a court’s weapon is much more 
unyielding: the Kansas Constitution.269  This Comment thus advises 
opponents of the collateral source rule to conduct an empirical study on 
the collateral source rule’s impact on defendants.  Otherwise, the 
collateral source rule could, as one commentator noted, face equal 
protection and rational basis challenges.270 
Senate Bill 335’s last version allowed the jury to consider the 
plaintiff’s collateral benefits in its determination but required the jury to 
itemize the verdict and the court to calculate the plaintiff’s damages 
minus his net collateral benefits.271  Had the bill passed, the Kansas 
Constitution would have likely invalidated this framework.272  Allowing 
the jury to hear evidence of the plaintiff’s insurance, even if the court 
conducts the final calculation, does not necessarily prevent jury prejudice 
against the plaintiff.  The jury could, for example, compensate for the 
insurance on the plaintiff’s noneconomic damages.  Instead, this 
Comment advises opponents of the collateral source rule to include a 
                                                     
 268. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6303(1) (West 2000) (allowing the admissibility 
of collateral source benefits “to the court in which the action was brought after a verdict for the 
plaintiff and before a judgment is entered on the verdict” (emphasis added)); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
548.36(5) (West 2000) (prohibiting courts from allowing juries to hear evidence of collateral 
sources). 
 269. Proponents of Senate Bill 335 have already considered some significant constitutional 
concerns.  By applying the abrogation to “any action,” legislators responded to the Wentling v. 
Medical Anesthesia Services, P.A., 701 P.2d 939 (Kan. 1985) decision, which partially invalidated 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-471, because it only applied to medical malpractice actions.  See supra notes 
124–32 and accompanying text (discussing Wentling).  Similarly, proponents have eliminated the 
$150,000 threshold.  See supra note 129 and accompanying text (quoting Wentling on this point).  In 
making this change, the legislature responded to Thompson v. KFB Insurance Co., 850 P.2d 773 
(Kan. 1993).  See supra text accompanying note 146 (noting Senate Bill 335 abrogates the collateral 
source rule in all cases, regardless of the plaintiff’s damages). 
 270. Young, supra note 3, at 168–69. 
 271. See supra text accompanying notes 148–50. 
 272. See Young, supra note 3, at 169 (noting the abrogation of the collateral source rule would 
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Kansas Constitution by allowing juries to consider—and 
thus be prejudiced by—evidence of the plaintiff’s insurance). 
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clause that effectively prohibits juries from hearing evidence of collateral 
source rules and, instead, allows courts to calculate the final damages 
award after the jury verdict.273 
In light of the possible inexistence of a medical malpractice crisis,274 
a legislature seeking to abrogate the rule must equip itself with a solid 
rational basis.  A policy shift away from deterrence and accountability 
may satisfy such a test.  The hypothesis that the collateral source rule 
does not deter defendants anymore because their liability insurance 
generally pays for the plaintiff’s damages constitutes a starting point.  
However, this hypothesis does not prove that the establishment of 
liability insurance has diluted the rule’s rationales.  Thus, this Comment 
calls for empirical research on the deterrent value of the rule and for a 
legislative balancing of, on one hand, both the collateral source rule’s 
deterrent and accountability policies and, on the other, the societal 
impact of the rule’s abrogation.  A legislative finding that the collateral 
source rule lacks deterrent value and a rejection of its accountability 
rationale will likely constitute a rational basis to adequately withstand 
constitutional scrutiny. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Kansas collateral source rule has evoked at least four legislative 
battles.275  In many states, the rule still stands, perhaps only as an archaic 
reminder that traditional deterrent and punitive policies may sometimes 
reign over what many consider common sense.  In Kansas, this pattern is 
most evident in the context of Medicare and Medicaid, as the two 
programs have severely complicated the collateral source rule’s 
application.276 
Pursuant to agreements between Medicare or Medicaid, on one hand, 
and the medical service provider, on the other, patients often receive 
discounted health care rates.  Plaintiffs and defendants have taken hold of 
these write-offs and, whenever the issue arises, focus their debates on 
whether the plaintiff or the defendant ought to receive the windfall.  
These windfall sophisms—often adopted by courts—have convoluted the 
                                                     
 273. See supra Part III.C.3 (noting this approach would likely withstand an equal protection 
challenge). 
 274. See Young, supra note 3, at 161–65 (arguing the nation is no longer experiencing a medical 
malpractice crisis). 
 275. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing these constitutional challenges). 
 276. See supra notes 12–17 and accompanying text (noting the difficulties facing the collateral 
source rule’s application to write-offs). 
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law and have too often unnecessarily prompted costly questions that 
should have never arisen. 
The latest attempt of the Kansas legislature to abrogate the rule, 
Senate Bill 335, could have significantly altered the Kansas personal 
injury litigation landscape.277  However, until the Kansas legislature 
eliminates the collateral source rule, courts should respect its policies of 
deterrence and accountability.  This does not imply, however, that the 
collateral source rule is constitutionally unyielding.  Rather, the 
legislative process will determine whether the Kansas rule stays or goes; 
the Kansas Constitution does not prevent the rule’s abrogation, 
particularly if the legislature couples its rule with a legislative balancing, 
specifically noting that the societal impact on plaintiffs outweighs the 
perceived deterrence and accountability values of the rule.278  Regardless, 
this decision befits a carefully reasoned legislative policy decision.  
Relevant considerations extend beyond the existence of a medical 
malpractice crisis or the rule’s benefits to insurance companies.279  To 
reach a sound and rational policy, the Kansas legislature must, first, 
consider empirical research on the Kansas rule’s deterrence and 
accountability effects and, second, weigh both policy values against the 
expected adverse effects of the Kansas collateral source rule’s 
abrogation. 
 
                                                     
 277. See supra Part II.B.4 (discussing Senate Bill 335). 
 278. See supra Part III.D (suggesting this as an attempt to avoid the possible constitutional 
problems associated with abrogation of the collateral source rule). 
 279. In her Note, Young states the Kansas legislature should not partially abrogate the collateral 
source rule because a medical malpractice crisis does not exist and insurance companies would 
unfairly benefit at the expense of plaintiffs, resulting in a “grave societal impact.”  See Young, supra 
note 3, at 161–67.  This Comment partially rebuts these arguments, noting that the legislature has the 
constitutional power to entirely abrogate the rule.  See supra Part III.C. 
